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OVERCOMING MANAGED CARE
REGULATORY CHAOS THROUGH A
RESTRUCTURED FEDERALISM
John D. Blumt
IN THE REALM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, feder-
alism can be classified as a perennial issue, its history predating
the adoption of the constitution itself.' Federalism conveys both
a sense of structure and a sense of mandate, and while it is not
as constant a presence in constitutional jurisprudence as issues
affecting individual rights, it is a concept, nevertheless, which is
a deeply rooted one, fundamental to government operations.
This article is written to reflect on federalism in health care, and
to suggest that the balance between Washington and the states
has been skewed in ways that are counter productive to effec-
tive governance of this sector, and that such imbalances must
not be tolerated as the status quo. The core argument driving the
analysis in this piece is that the current regulatory frenzy in
,managed care presents a picture of uncoordinated, and short
sighted efforts, often motivated by political gains which only
serve to proliferate intergovernmental conflict, duplication of
efforts, spawn unnecessary costs, and move us further away
from a coordinated vision of government health care policy. The
constitutional purists of the world who may stumble across this
article should recognize that it is written by a health law aca-
demic who believe that constitutional doctrine underpinning
federalism is fungible doctrine that should be changed when it
no longer serves the public interest, and that the first step in a
journey of a thousand miles maybe a slippery one.
t John J. Waldron Research Professor of Health Law, Loyola University Chi-
cago, School of Law Institute for Health Law.
'See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY





Health policy is a rather disparate enterprise in that it is
composed of multiple actors pursuing a wide range of often-
unrelated activities that are linked only by a generic goal of en-
hancing individual and collective health.2 For purposes of this
paper, health policy will be viewed more narrowly as those ac-
tions of government, at the state and federal levels, which are
directed toward the oversight, management and delivery of
health services. While many health policies have their origins in
non-governmental settings, increasingly, governmental entities
have become the primary actors in developing or adopting ap-
proaches to our health delivery, using their considerable fund-
ing and regulatory authority to dominate this sector.
The history of government health policy is one which re-
flects ongoing and evolving relationships between the respec-
tive levels of government. Health in all its facets has never
been the purview of one level of government, but rather is an
enterprise characterized by the involvement of respective gov-
ernmental units based on tradition, legal imperative, and practi-
cality. The world of government health policy, which predates
Medicare and Medicaid, is one in which states were guided by a
sense of public interest, empowered by the rather vague man-
date of the Tenth Amendment.4 Throughout much of the 20th
century, state governments were primarily responsible for pub-
lic health issues, regulating professionals, and facilities, as well
as maintaining a public health administrative and regulatory in-
frastructure, which often included the provision of services in
some areas such as mental health. 5 This is not to say that the
2 See KEITH J. MUELLER, HEALTH CARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-16
(1993) (demonstrating the range of political values within the context of public
health).
3 See Robert F. Rich & William D. White, Health Care Policy and the Ameri-
can States: Issues of Federalism, in HEALTH PoLIcy, FEDERALISM, AND THE
AMERICAN STATES 3, 17-25 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); see
also Robert F. Rich & William D. White, Federalism and Health Policy, 1998 U. ILL.
L. REv. 861 (1998). For an excellent discussion of federalism in public health, see
James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modem Public Health Goals Through Govern-
ment: An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 93 (1997).
4 See Rich & White, Health Care Policy and the American States: Issues of
Federalism, supra note 3, at 8-20; see also Hodge, supra note 3, at 100-06.
5 See Rich & White, Health Care Policy and the American States: Issues of
Federalism, supra note 3, at 16-25.
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federal government did not play a role in health policy, but that
role was restricted to discrete areas where national policies were
required, and to the provision of financial support for medical
research and grant programs to assist with the development of
public health programs at the state level. There were times in
the first half of the 20th century in which federal policy makers
skirted with national health insurance as an outgrowth of Social
Security, but that movement never came close enough to frui-
tion to effect a serious consideration of how such a massive un-
dertaking would impact questions of federalism.
6
With the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, the
respective roles of federal and state governments were dramati-
cally expanded and at both levels, government became a pri-
mary participant in the financing and administration of health
services for large segments of the American population.7
Through the Medicare program, the federal government was
able to exert a profound influence on the delivery of medical
care at the local level. While Medicare is offered in the private
sector, and in turn, is dependent on states' regulatory infra-
structure, its policies, particularly in areas of reimbursement,
and to a lesser extent, quality assurance, have had a profound
impact on the operations of the health system, and have been
frequently replicated by states and the private sector.8
Medicaid, a structural outgrowth of prior public health pro-
grams, presents a more direct brand of federalism, as it was es-
tablished as a dually administered operation between the federal
and state governments.9 While Medicaid affords states' discre-
tion concerning the scope of benefits and administration of their
6 See generally Theodore R. Marmor, Forecasting American Healthcare:
How We Got Here and Where We Might Be Going, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
551 (1998) (reviewing and predicting the changes in medicine and healthcare since
World War I); Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism
and Health Care Reform, 28 CONN. L. REv. 115 (1995) (discussing the role federal-
ism can play in health care reform).
7 See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 367-74 (1982) (describing the impact of redistributive.governmental health
care reform).
8 See generally 42 U.S.C.A § 1396 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (appropriating
federal money to states to enable them to administer programs of necessary medical
assistance to low-income families).
9 See John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicaid, 340
NEw ENG. J. MED. 403,403 (1999); see also Health Care Financing Admin. (HCFA),




respective programs, the program operates under federal over-
sight, and the history of this dually administered enterprise has
been one of contention between the respective levels of gov-
ernment. 10 In particular, federal and state regulators most often
disagree about funding, and over the years they have had a se-
ries of intergovernmental disputes related to joint financing re-
sponsibilities which have accelerated with heightened federal
mandates being placed on state Medicaid programs. In spite of
increased tensions which Medicaid sparked between the respec-
tive levels of government, a certain equilibrium developed in
intergovernmental relations, and the parties were able to recog-
nize the boundaries which separated their activities, and even
adjust to the often Byzantine rules of dual coverage which char-
acterized areas like long term care. 1'
While it is difficult to capsulize the respective roles of gov-
ernment during the period 1965 through 1990, it can be con-
cluded that much of the focus of the regulatory enterprise was
directed primarily at managing the costs of the two large public
programs. 12 In turn, the fiscal pressures felt by government
spilled over into the private sector and forced employer health
benefit programs to adopt a more aggressive posture toward the
purchasing and management of health care, resulting in the
promotion of what is now collectively referred to as managed
care. 13 The private sector's embrace of managed care spawned
the expansion of publicly supported prepaid health in the late
1990s, far beyond the federal and state courtship with these de-
livery systems in the 1980s.14 In fact, private sector managed
care, promoted by large employers and government, has been
1o See Iglehart, supra note 9, 405-06.
11 See U.S. General Accounting Office, No. GAO/T-HEHS-97-119, Medicare
and Medicaid: Meeting Needs of Dual Eligibles Raises Difficult Cost and Care Is-
sues, Hearings Before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate (1997) (testi-
mony of William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Fin. & Sys. Issues).
12 See MUELLER, supra note 2, at 67-99 (reviewing different attempts at con-
trolling the cost of providing health care).
13 See generally Michael J. Taylor, The Employer's View of Managed Health
Care: Show Me the Value, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 555, 555-65
(Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 4th ed. 2001) (discussing trends in managed care affecting
employers).
14 See id. at 556-61.
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the primary catalyst for the reorganization of local health care
market places.15
Spurred largely by costs, the Clinton administration's
health reform initiatives in the early 1990s was anchored by the
notion of a competitive marketplace, so-called managed com-
petition in which local health plans would be actively compet-
ing for business on the bases of both cost and quality. While the
Clinton's massive federal initiative was stymied by politics,
both the federal and state governments turned to managed care
products as primary vehicles for the delivery of health services
at reduced costs.1 6 At the federal level, Congress through the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 initiated a strong new managed
care option for Medicare, adding part C to the program, and in
the process, broadening the options of enrollees to choose from
a wider range of plan designs. While the expansion of managed
care options has altered Medicare, the program has never un-
dergone wide sweeping reform. 17 Recent talk of Medicare re-
form is often based on the adoption of the seemingly less com-
plex Federal Employee Health Benefit pro ram which depends
heavily on the use of managed care plans.,1 At the state level,
managed care has been pursued vigorously through waiver pro-
grams, as a vehicle to salvage ever costly and expanding state
Medicaid budgets. 19 In some cases, such as Tennessee, entire
Medicaid programs were converted into managed care based
operations; the majority of states have actively pursued some
15 See generally James C. Robinson, The Future of Managed Care Organiza-
tion: Health Care May Be a Local Business, But Managed Care Is a National Enter-
prise, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 7.
16 See generally Robert E. Hurley & Stephen A. Somers, Medicaid Managed
Care, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 684, 684-701 (Peter R. Kongstvedt
ed., 4th ed. 2001) (discussing how managed care emerged as a major Medicaid re-
form strategy).
17 See U.S. General Accounting Office, No. GAOIT-HEHS/AIMD-00-103,
Medicare Reform: Leading Proposals Lay Groundwork, While Design Decisions Lie
Ahead, Testimony Before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate (2000) (testimony
of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States).
18 See generally Harry P. Cain II, Moving Medicare to the FEHBP Model, or
How to Make an Elephant Fly: Can Medicare Really Be Modernized?, HEALTH AFF.
July-Aug. 1999, at 25.
19 See generally BARRY R. FuRRow Er AL., HEALTH LAW § 12-11, at 612-16
(2d ed. 2000) (describing the history of Medicaid managed care programs).
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type of prepaid health care scheme for significant portions of
their Medicaid population.2 °
MANAGED CARE: CONTROLLING
THE NEW BEAST
Unquestionably managed care, in all its manifestations, has
had a profound influence on federal and state health policy
during the last ten years.2' The movement toward managed care
has changed the playing field of federalism, but in and of itself
it does not encapsulize the entire story of intergovernmental
health policy. Another key factor in recent health policy has
been the push of federal legislators to fill the void left by the
demise of the Clinton health reform initiative through the en-
actment of a series of coverage mandates to address short falls
in the system. It has been suggested that the Clinton admini-
stration took an incremental approach to health legislation to
achieve some of the goals they could not in their broader reform
initiative, in addition to using executive power to fill in gaps in
coverage and other policy areas. Federal legislation, such as the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 22 the Chil-
dren's Health Insurance Program, 23 the Mental Health Parity
Act,24 and a number of smaller coverage mandates can be
viewed collectively as an attempt to create a type of federal
floor in the coverage area. The states, in their own right,
stepped into the coverage void left by the failed federal health
reform initiative, and they too enacted numerous coverage man-
dates affecting insurance plans under their respective control.25
20 See Marsha Gold, Markets and Public Programs: Insights from Oregon
and Tennessee, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 633 (1997) (describing Tennessee's
initiative to reconfigure its Medicaid program into a managed-care-based operation).
21 See generally Marilyn Denny, Managed Care: Increasing Inequality &
Individualism, 3 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 59 (2000) (analyzing the impact of the
growth of managed care on the poor and the elderly).
22 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
23 State Children's Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-jj (Supp.
IV 1998).
24 The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a (West 1999),
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-5 (West Supp. 2000).
25 See Joel C. Cantor et al., Challenges of State Health Reform: Variations in
Ten States, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 191, 191-92; see also Douglas A. Hast-
ings, Patient Rights Meet Managed Care: Understanding the Underlying Conflicts,
31 J. HEALTH L. 241 (1998).
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It is the combination of the large scale adoption of managed
care, spawned in part by government, together with the surge in
federal and state coverage mandates, which has set the stage for
a realtered health care federalism. Managed care brought with
it new rules for the provision of medical care that collectively
ushered in rapid changes in the delivery of medical services,
and raised the ire of patient and provider alike, quickly galva-
nizing the political community into action as managed care
plans have become the pariahs of the early 21st century.26 The
same politicians who saw managed care as a vehicle to contain
publicly supported health care programs became champions of
protecting individual rights against their new enemies, the Man-
aged Care Organizations. Fueled with negative anecdotes, leg-
islators devised command and control strategies to restore the
balance of power back to patients and physicians alike.27 Solu-
tions for the ills spread by managed care were sought in estab-
lished consumer protection laws, as well as in the development
of a new body of legislation and regulations which was directed
toward banning overt abuses, and affording patients/providers
with new rights.28
At both the federal and state levels of government there has
been a rush to address the "managed care crisis" through a wide
range of "patient protection" measures. 29 The Congress has at-
tempted for several years to enact a patient bill of rights, and
until recently politics has scuttled that goal, but administrative
channels have been used to promote such policies.30 For exam-
ple, in the final years of the Clinton administration an initiative
to extend patient protections to Medicare beneficiaries, federal
employees and those enrolled in health plans regulated by the
Department of Labor was launched. At the state level, there has
been considerably more success in passing laws affecting man-
aged care operations, as a host of new patient protection meas-
ures have been enacted into law.31
26 See generally Gregg Easterbrook, Managing Fine, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 20,
2000, at 21, 22 (discussing the impact of HMOs on health care).2 7 See, e.g., Hastings, supra note 25.
2' See id.
29 See icL at 245-46 (discussing "anti-managed care" efforts).
30 See Office of Personnel Management, Patients' Bill of Rights and the Fed-
eral Employees Health Benefits Program (visited Apr. 3, 2001)
<http:llwww.opm.gov/insurelhtmllbillrights.html>.
31 See Hastings, supra note 25, at 245-54.
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The patient protection area is illustrative of the imbalance
that currently characterizes health care federalism. Curiously
enough, it is not a battle over content that is being waged, rather
there appears to be a general consensus about the nature of the
safeguards that ought to be enacted. 32 Typically patient protec-
tion measures include informational requirements, third party
appeals, timely access to care, access to specialists, availability
of emergency care based on a prudent layperson standard, etc.
The movement to create patients' rights in managed care is still
ongoing, but the interim results present a panoply of related, but
scattered state laws and federal initiatives. It seems clear that
the federal government will pass some type of patient protection
legislation as public sentiment for it remains strong, and even
though the area is marked by political ambivalence, failure to
act here would serve to underscore the weakness of Congres-
sional governance, and would reflect poorly on the abilities of
the new Bush administration to usher in compromise.34 With a
federal patient bill of right, a series of pro-patient provisions,
similar to those already enacted in the states, will be applied to
enrollees in individual and group health care coverage pro-
grams, and the federal rights provisions will form a floor on
which states may add their own provisions. Whatever final ver-
sion of federal patient protection emerges, it is safe to conclude
that the role of the Health Care Financing Administration for
regulating the behavior of individual health plans will only be
expanded.
WELL, WHAT'S YOUR POINT ?
At first blush, it appears that the duplication of regulatory
efforts in managed care is only destined to increase, and that
federalism in this area could spin out of control. The reality of
federalism in MCO regulation can, however, be viewed in
calmer terms, and the emerging chaos can be attributed in large
part to the odd situation created by the Employee Retirement
and Income Security Act (ERISA). Under the ERISA regula-
tory scheme, qualified plans are exempt from state regulation,
32 See id. at 245-51 (discussing areas of general consensus).
33 See id.
34 See generally John McCain & John Edwards, Patients' Rights: Let's See
Some Bipartisanship, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at A23 (discussing several patients'
rights bills that have been before Congress).
15 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (West 1999).
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and are governed by a series of statutory principles and regula-
tions developed by the U.S. Department of Labor.36 The pre-
emption section of ERISA truncates the ability of states to
regulate all private health insurance vehicles, as this law ex-
empts self funded health plans from state regulations, and cre-
ates a dual system of health plan regulation. Also the enrollees
who participate in ERISA governed plans are severely limited
in the types of legal remedies they may avail themselves of in
disputes against their respective plans.37 Thus, the federal gov-
ernment, as a result of the ERISA preemption, must act to fill in
the gaps created by this curious health benefit regulatory struc-
ture. Additionally, regardless of the avalanche of state laws af-
fecting patients and provider rights, and the coverage mandates,
so-called, "body parts" legislation, states have not always de-
veloped a noteworthy track record in health insurance regula-
tion. Serious problems have existed in individual and group
health insurance market regulation, prompting Washington to
enact HIPAA in 1996 and for the first time, enter into the busi-
ness of regulating private insurance markets, an area of tradi-
tional state regulation.3
8
It can be argued that while there has been a certain dupli-
cation of efforts in state and federal managed care (health insur-
ance) regulation, the sum total of federalism affecting MCO is-
sues, is a regulatory structure in which eventually a balance will
emerge. The states will continue to be leaders in regulating pri-
vate health insurance, and will press for comprehensive controls
over MCOs, addressing fundamental structural and operational
issues, such as scope of benefits, capitalization, and risk bearing
policies to be applied to fluid models in this area.39 In turn,
Washington will provide guidance for developing managed care
policies, and will work with the states to operationalize these
policies, particularly in quality of care, and access areas, using
ERISA as a primary lever. The federal authorities will utilize
their power over Medicare, and their leverage over Medicaid, as
a way to promote progressive MCO operational policies, and
36 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, § 8-2, at 420.
37 See generally id. § 8-6, at 445-47 (describing differences between ERISA
benefit determinations and typical health insurance claim denial cases).38 See generally id. § 9-7, at 489-92 (discussing provisions of HIIPAA).
39 See Thomas G. Goddard, Managed Care and the Regulatory Arena, in
MANAGED CARE: INTEGRATING THE DELIVERY AND FINANCING OF HEALTH CARE:




those policies will impact the MCO field generally. A foray into
patient protection will expand federal authority in the MCO
area, but the states will realistically still play a key enforcement
role in the area. This period of evolving MCO regulation can be
seen as one of inevitable imbalance, driven by complex changes
in our delivery system which are being assimilated into an al-
ready intricate structure of health care federalism, which in
spite of constant political and economic wrangling seems to
eventually achieve a balanced approach to regulation.
There is, however, another more critical perspective on
managed care regulation and federalism that sees these devel-
opments as the triumph of politics, and legally driven consum-
erism, challenging the conclusion that federalism is an exercise
in achieving horizontal balances that follow cyclical patterns.
The current status of managed care regulation can be viewed as
occurring because of a void in national, and states' vision con-
cerning what the structure of American health care should be.
At best, there exists only a muddled public view of the specific
goals for our health system. Like other areas of domestic policy,
government has been willing to turn to the private sector to
meet public responsibility and in the process endorse a vision
crafted in the marketplace. But for all their abilities to innovate
and harness new technologies, private health care markets are
driven by agendas that do not often mesh with necessary public
needs. Managed care plans are creatures of the market, and
while they may contain costs, and service most needs of their
enrolled populations, they have yet to prove that these plans can
function in ways that address the larger societal questions of
access, and respond to the needs for accountability and quality.
Perhaps there has never been a time in the public forum in
which a broad consensus about health policy and the structure
of our delivery system existed, but the rapidity of change to-
ward a culture managed care has dramatically illustrated the
flaws in American public health policy, and has further served
to underscore how counterproductive our system of federalism
is in this arena has been.
In the context of federalism, a harsher view of managed
care regulation will no doubt be meet by arguments that inno-
vation in American health policy does not flow out of central-
ized consensus. Innovations in regulation are the result of 50
states and the federal government pursuing conflicting agendas
which play themselves out in a sort of Darwinian process, in
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which the most viable regulatory approaches survive. Viability
in such a context demands varied approaches to regulation
which resonate politically, legally and economically in desirable
ways within different jurisdictions. The words of Justice Bran-
deis are often paraphrased, that states are the laboratories of the
federal government, so instead of recoiling at the idea of dupli-
cation and inconsistency, we tend to embrace a process of par-
allel regulatory efforts, and see such efforts as a chance to inno-
vate, and thus elevate such innovations, duplicative or not, to
expressions of democracy in action.40 While the regulatory
status quo which buttresses state power may be laudable, it must
be justified at some point by the results it achieves, and by the
cost/ benefits it produces. Solving ever pressing health care is-
sues of cost, quality and access problems just might require a
new approach to policy making. Startling statistics in the health
arena abound, but few are more compelling than those which
document the growing numbers of uninsured in America, or the
cost statistics which points out that half of the global expendi-
tures in health can be attributed to the American trillion dollar
health enterprise. Simply put, the costs in health care are too
high, and access and quality too vulnerable, for us as a society
to indefinitely tolerate the awkward ways in which this sector is
regulated.
One approach which has been used by federal policy mak-
ers in meshing national and state policies has been to treat fed-
eral initiatives as regulatory floors on which states can build
their own mandates. The most current example of the "federal
floor" approach is seen in the HIPAA privacy regulations in
which a detailed set of requirements has been issued on the fed-
eral level which in turn allows states to add their own require-
ments.42 Such a policy is a reflection of a political compromise
which is a Washington concession to state governments' tradi-
tional role in privacy, and while it may have appeal on this
level, it is an invitation to chaos. What HIPAA privacy rules
have done is to allow disparate regulatory treatment of patient
data from state to state, and in the process create logistical di-
40 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (cautioning the Court in its limitation of state experimentation).
41 See Barry R. Bloom, The Future of Public Health, HARV. PUB. HEALTH
REv., Fall 2000, at 4.
42 See Standards for the Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Informa-
tion, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (2000) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).
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lemmas for information which should be able to cross jurisdic-
tional lines without such impediments. 43 It is likely that HIPAA
federalism issues will necessitate the creation of a separate of-
fice within HHS to unbundle and referee the inevitable disputes.
Federal regulatory policies should have unitary effects, and
while allowing states to add on to federal regulations may have
political appeal, it is not wise public policy.
IS THERE A CURE?
Assuming the reader has not discarded this article as utter
nonsense, or the harmless ranting of some obscure academic,
the question arises about how our regulatory process in health
care can be fixed, and a healthy balance created between
Washington and the states. More specifically, can any changes
be made in the framework of our system of federalism so that
our nation does not have to continue with this current, ineffi-
cient process of crafting duplicative regulatory policies in areas
like managed care. The fact is, managed care is just a current
example of strained federalism, and that whatever health care
system follows the present one, it too will be buffeted on the
shoals of federalism. It may be tempting to recommend whole-
sale alteration of our federal system, but such recommendations
are too devoid of reality to be worth considering. What would
make some sense, however, is a reexamination, and a rational
reordering, of regulatory responsibilities in American health
care which could serve the respective levels of government as
guideposts for formulating new regulatory strategies. It is, how-
ever, not an easy task to identify lines of demarcation in health
regulation that could be widely agreed upon, as the roots of fed-
eral and state interests in this area run deep, and refocusing di-
visions of authority would open impassioned legal and political
battles.
Undoubtedly there are many different approaches which
could be postulated that would be helpful to the development of
a new regulatory structure for health care federalism. There are
also general principles for guiding a new health care regulatory
structure that would arouse universal support, but may not have
value in a practical sense. For example, few would argue that all
Americans should not have access to high quality medical care,
but such an aspiration does not serve as an operational guide-
43 See id. at 82,463 (discussing state-specific health privacy protections).
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post in realtering the federal/state regulatory processes in an
operational sense. Still, recognizing the practical barriers, and
more specifically, those of a legal and political nature, it ap-
pears that considering a basic set of recommendations for re-
formatting intergovernmental health regulation in managed care
and beyond is needed, and the exercise of attempting to articu-
late such recommendations, in and of itself, has merit.
This essay will offer six basic recommendations directed
toward refocusing health care regulation, and in the process re-
orienting health care federalism. Four of the recommendations
will expand the roles of federal regulators, and the other two
will serve to affirm state regulatory powers. The first broad rec-
ommendation for redefining health care federalism is that dis-
crepancies in health care coverage across state lines should not
be tolerated. There is no sound public policy reason why either
government sponsored or private plans should vary in terms of
core health benefits covered from state to state. Designing a
standard core benefit package, no doubt, will be challenging,
but it is an issue which has been confronted by all payers, pub-
lic and private and the experiences of Oregon Medicaid should
be particularly helpful. Inherent in a federal role in benefit de-
sign will be the responsibility of Washington to take the lead in
assessing new technologies, including pharmaceuticals, to de-
termine whether or not insurance coverage shall be provided.44
Undoubtedly, placing coverage decisions in federal hands will
require changes in law, but such changes should be made to ad-
dress the chaotic patchwork which now exists in the coverage
area, as the health system is in dire need of consensus on what it
is that the system should actually cover.45
The second recommendation concerning federalism is that
questions of reimbursement and distribution of resources should
be made at the federal level. Sound public policy demands that
discrepancies in reimbursement policies in the same geographi-
cal area, from payer to payer, should not exist. Medicare should
take the lead, and be used as a national model for all health care
payment programs, and its policies in fraud and abuse should be
applied to all payers. Cross subsidization should no longer be
seen as the way to equalize payment levels, but the federal gov-
44 See generally Joe Paduda, Health Care Industry Needs to Refocus, Bus.
INS., Feb. 26, 2001, at 12 (noting the industry-wide problems involved in the provi-
sion of health care benefits to employees).
45 See generally id.
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ernment should design payment policies which are realistic, and
place all health care coverage programs on equal footing. In the
area of resources the goal of the federal regulators should be the
creation of a delivery system, providing services which are uni-
formly available. States should not be able to interfere in na-
tional schemes to distribute resources equally. For example, the
efforts of a state to safeguards harvested organs within its bor-
ders, and prevent those organs from being transported across
state lines, should not be tolerated.46 Like core coverage and
reimbursement policies, the goal of Washington should be eq-
uity in the availability of covered services and states must yield
in this area to federal authority, in order to meet broader public
policy goals to achieve a more uniformly available set of serv-
ices.
The third recommendation that will alter federalism is that
the federal government should be primarily responsible to re-
view and endorse medical standards and guidelines concerning
the practice of medicine. 47 Undoubtedly some will argue that
government at any level should not be involved in making deci-
sions about medical practice, and that such matters are the sole
purview of the health professions. This argument, however, fails
to take into account the reality that the federal government
through its financial and regulatory roles is already far too em-
broiled in the health delivery system not to be making decisions
about the processes used in delivering medical care. While the
government may not develop the specific processes for deliver-
ing care, it certainly has a responsibility to examine the safety
and efficacy of treatments and demand clinicians support their
conduct with conclusive outcome data. These evaluations
should serve as the bases for coverage and reimbursement poli-
cies.
The need to evaluate medical care process and efficacy will
only expand with the explosion in biological knowledge, the
growth of bioinformatics and the continued popularity of alter-
native treatments. Aside from the goal of achieving some
broader basis of uniformity in medical care delivery, govern-
ment in its health services research role will be called on to
46 See Organ Transplants: Wisconsin to Lead Multistate Lawsuit to Block
New Federal Organ Allocation, Health Care Daily (BNA) (Mar. 16, 2000).
47 See generally Alice G. Gosfield, Who Is Holding Whom Accountable for
Quality?, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 26 (explaining the current state of the
health care industry as related to regulation and consumer expectations).
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safeguard the public against an onslaught of global health in-
formation and new treatment options. States simply lack the re-
sources for the future evaluative tasks that will be required.
Even now, the state agencies which have grappled with assess-
ing the viability of medical procedures for purposes of coverage
can only perform such a function in a very limited manner, and
the public benefits of such decision making at the state level,
beyond individual case coverage, is uncertain at best.
The fourth recommendation to guide the revamping of
health care federalism concerns patients and their individual
rights. While states need to be involved in the enforcement of
patient rights, there should be a set of uniform rights afforded
patients across the country, and as such, policies in this area
must be made at the federal level.48 By tradition, patient rights
issues have been the purview of state government from both a
common and statutory point of view. The federal government,
however, has made inroads into this area, using its administra-
tive authority (and to a lesser extent legislative) to promote pa-
tient right protections through various administrative initia-
tives.49 As pointed out earlier in this article, states have been
rushing into legislative forays to enact a whole series of patient
protections, motivated by concerns about managed care abuses
and concern over Washington's inaction. In the long run, having
each state promote separate patient right policies only leads to a
confused and disjointed situation, and just as discrepancies in
coverage and reimbursement should not be tolerated, so too dis-
crepancies affecting individual rights ought not exist.
The fifth recommendation in federal/state health policy re-
lations is one that recognizes a central role for the states. The
delivery of medical care is primarily a local enterprise, so
regulations of facilities and health professional are best left in
the hands of the states. State regulators have traditionally taken
the lead in protecting the public health in their respective juris-
dictions, and such a role should be continued, and if necessary
48 See generally Robert J. Blendon et al., Health Care in the Upcoming 2000
Election, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2000, at 210 (explaining key voter concerns re-
garding health care and how these concerns relate to the presidential candidates'
health plans).
49 See Children's Health: HHS Releases Proposed CHIP Rule; Administra-
tion Stresses Patient Protections, Health Care Daily (BNA) (Nov. 2, 1999).
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expanded.50 For example, it should be a state's decision to ex-
plore the competitive viability of local health markets, and de-
terminations of the appropriateness of market alterations should
remain the purview of state attorneys general. In situations
where the delivery system is not bounded by state borders such
as the case of the emerging area of telemedicine and e-health,
states must yield to federal authority, or develop a uniform
compact for assuring that the issue will be handled in similar
fashion across the country.
51
Incorporated into the regulation of the delivery system,
there should be a responsibility on the part of states to manage
health care reimbursement systems, and states should be dele-
gated to be involved in local fraud and abuse investigations.
While overall reimbursement policies ought to be created at the
federal level, the operational side of reimbursement should be
turned over to the states. Public and private reimbursement
dollars should flow through a central state authority, and where
local cost variables need to be recognized, such judgements
should be made by state reimbursement authorities, based upon
application of federal guidelines.
The final recommendation for a revised federalism in
health policy concerns a revision of an old idea, health plan-
ning. Since the heyday of the 1970s the notion of mandated
statewide health planning document has hardly been in vogue.
52
Still the processes involved in a public assessment of the health
delivery system in a particular jurisdiction, and the development
of goals, and a plan of action for health policies, could be ex-
tremely helpful. Clearly there exist numerous plans concerning
health care, including federal agency plans, as well as national
and state public health plans, Medicaid plans, and a host of
other lesser programmatic planning documents. In a restructured
50 See Eleanor D. Kinney, Clearing the Way for an Effective Federal-State
Partnership in Health Reform, 32 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 899, 912-16 (1999) (detail-
ing state involvement in public health policy-making).
51 See Federation of State Medical Boards, A Model Act to Regulate the Prac-
tice of Medicine Across State Lines: An Introduction and Rationale, (visited Apr. 12,
2001) <http://www.fsmb.orgtelemed.htm>.
52 See generally Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, Regulating Managed Care Cover-
age: A New Direction for Health-Planning Agencies, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1 (1998)
(highlighting necessary changes that health planning agencies must make to regulate
managed care programs); Bruce Spitz, The Elusive New Federalism, HEALTH AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 150 (discussing the relationship between federal and state ap-
proaches to meeting citizens' health care needs).
342 [Vol. I11:327
20011 OVERCOMING MANAGED CARE REGULATORY CHAOS 343
federalism arrangement, it would be very helpful for states to
develop an annual health plan that would clearly spell out goals
and objectives in health policy and regulation, and lay out a
plan of action for a particular year. The planning document
would need to be reviewed and commented upon by a federal
authority, and it would become a type of contract between the
branches of government, providing a record which articulates
the boundaries of governmental authority and responsibilities in
the health sector. A state's failure to adhere to the particulars of
their plan would result in reductions in federal funding, or in an
increase in federal involvement in state affairs. Presently indi-
vidual entities have been given authority to act as they see fit,
driven by a need to succeed in competitive markets, and not by
a sense of creating a sound public health system.
A CONSTITUTIONAL WAKE-UP CALL
Undoubtedly a reader with a passing familiarity with health
policy will realize that each of the six principles posited for a
realtered health care federalism are fraught with legal and po-
litical pitfalls. Even the most seemingly benign changes in the
federal/ state relation in health policy will be fought vigorously.
The uncertainties in health regulation and the lack of regulatory
vision exists because any meaningful change in government
health policy is now excruciatingly difficult to achieve, and
must be sparked by a major crisis. Clearly any of the six princi-
ples enunciated in this essay would be battered on the reefs of
politics, and both federal and state politicians will be equally
vehement in opposition to changes in current operations which
they perceive as diminishing their power in any way. But there
is always a possibility that fundamental change could occur, and
certainly there is a great deal to recommend a dramatic altera-
tion of the status quo in health policy.
As this article is contained in a health law journal, perhaps
the objections that will be voiced most vigorously will come
from legal minds who will question whether the author has any
clue that the pendulum of federalism is clearly moving away
from regulatory dominance by Washington.53 Based on recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, there is a growing sense that the
53 See generally MICHAEL S. GREvE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATrERS,
How IT COULD HAPPEN (1999) (describing the evolution of federalism) (summary
discussion <http:llwww.federalismproject.orgllibrarylbooks/realfederalism.htm>).
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integrity of states must be protected against federal dominance.
To ignore the realities of current constitutional law trends in
considering fundamental changes in regulatory policies is no
doubt foolhardy. Questions involving the division of govern-
ment power are deeply rooted in constitutional jurisprudence,
and have a long and tangled history in the courts, with roots that
trace back to our founding fathers. It is the curious nature of the
American Constitution, with its artful placing of limitations on
government power, that has given us a system in which two
separate government structures, federal and state, have authority
over identical matters, thus leading to the ongoing concerns that
frame federalism questions. Grapplings with the demarcations
of government power have their origins in early American his-
tory, and represent ongoing disputes over the role of federal
regulation, the scope of state authority, and the rights of citizens
to be free from unwarranted government control at any level.54
Federalism, sparks consideration of multiple concepts such the
doctrines of preemption, enumerated powers, police power, the
Commerce Clause, etc. and touches on jurisprudence underlying
the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. 55 For
purposes of this analysis, the consideration of the extensive
body of constitutional jurisprudence which addresses these
multifaceted matters will be limited to reflections on the recent
U.S. Supreme Court opinions concerning federalism, and to a
review of the Clinton Executive Orders which deals with feder-
alism as a broader analysis of this area exceeds the scope of this
essay.
While legal scholars and state rights advocates have always
had a fascination with federalism, it seems to be more of an
academic and theoretical concern, in that the 20th century was
one in which the federal government consistently amassed
greater power. In particular, under the auspices of the Com-
merce Clause virtually all domestic endeavors appear to fall
within the ambit of Congressional authority. The power of the
states has been eroded through the use of federal preemption,
and even more so by a seemingly endless stream of laws which
have created a type of quid pro quo in which states obtain fed-
eral funds in return for loss of control over the endeavor in
54 See DUMBAULD, supra note 1, at 140-56 (discussing the value of the Bill of
Rights to modem society).
55 See id. at 127-39 (discussing the heightened constitutional value of the Bill
of Rights and its ties to the Fourteenth Amendment).
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question.56 Even a program like Medicaid in which states also
are very involved in funding is dominated by Washington con-
trol because more than half of program's financing is national.57
While legislation and politics lie at the heart of the inter-
governmental relationship, the position of the courts in deci-
phering the balance between the states and the federal govern-
ment is critical. There has been a dramatic change at the U.S.
Supreme Court in how the majority of the Court views the issue
of federalism, and a seemingly insurmountable body of pro-
federal government case law has been replaced by a new juris-
prudence of state's rights. 58 In a series of recent decisions the
Court has seemed to restore the Tenth Amendment power of the
states, and has given states legal deference in areas of tradi-
tional state based regulation. 59 In a widely cited environmental
law case, New York v. United States,60 the Court ruled that the
Congress had exceeded its authority in the Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985, by mandating certain
state actions. Justice O'Connor noted that: "States are not mere
political subdivisions of the United States. State governments
are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies ... .,61 in
addition to reaffirming the states unique role in governance un-
der the Tenth Amendment, the Court has also focused on the
Commerce Clause and has acted on the notion that Congres-
sional power under the clause is not absolute. 62
The best known of the recent Commerce Clause rulings is
the case of United States v. Lopez63 in which the Court found
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 to be an unconstitu-
tional intrusion into an area traditionally regulated by the states.
The Court provided a strict reading of the Commerce Clause
and noted that the regulation of handguns within school zones
56 See generally GREVE, supra note 53.
57 See FURROW Er AL., supra note 19, § 12-1, at 585-86.
58 See American Enterprise Institute, Federalism & Separation of Powers
Practice Group, Federalist Society, Federalism: A Tenth Amendment and Enumerated
Powers Revival? [hereinafter AEI Federalism Project] (visited May 17, 2001)
<http:llwww.federalismproject.orglnews/fedsoc.html> (presenting a panel discussion
of the issues surrounding federalism and the meaning of the Tenth Amendment).
51 See id.
60 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
61 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).62 See Stephen Ganter, Comment, Did United States v. Lopez Turn Back the
Clock on the Commerce Clause?, 21 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 343 (1996).63514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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could not be construed as a form of interstate commerce regula-
tion.64 Justice Kennedy in a concurring opinion presented a very
strong endorsement of state sovereignty, characterizing it as an
essential safeguard of individual liberty.6 5 Kennedy argued that
the Court needs to intervene to preserve the necessary balance
between states and the federal government, and that deference
should be provided to the states in areas, like education, where
they have traditionally taken the lead in regulation. 66
If the recent Tenth Amendment cases are read in conjunc-
tion with the Commerce Clause decisions, it seems apparent
that the Court has taken a different tact in the area of states
rights, and that any suggestions of altering the intergovernmen-
tal balance in health policy will hit a wall of constitutional
challenges. No doubt federalism has been reinvigorated, but the
recent cases decisions must be viewed against a broader legal
backdrop which is one that has endorsed a broad concept of
federal power. The dissenting opinion in Lopez by Justice
Breyer harkens back to a more familiar legal tradition in which
the power of the Congress to regulate under the Commerce
Clause is very broad and all encompassing. 67 Breyer points out
in Lopez that the Court in past cases found no Commerce
Clause violations in situations in which the link between regu-
lation and commerce was far weaker than in Lopez.68 The Court
in Lopez was also careful not to overrule prior Commerce
Clause cases and disavow a long tradition in this area. In look-
ing at the recent cases involving federalism, a noted analyst in
the area pointed out that the recent Supreme Court opinions
have a distinct status bent, with the dominant focus being on
state sovereignty, as opposed to citizen choice or state competi-
tion.6 9 Federalism has been asserted in areas where states have
strong traditions of regulation, such as health care and the con-
cept of dramatic failure in state regulatory efforts, justifying
intervention by the Congress, is not one the courts have consid-
ered in balancing intergovernmental power. These recent feder-
alism decisions, however, do nothing to alter the Congress'
abilities to use the power of the purse to circumvent the states,
64 See Lopez, U.S. 514 at 564-68.
65 See id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
66 See id. at 579-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67 See id. at 615-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68 See id. at 625-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69 See GREVE, supra note 53.
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and if an arm of the federal government is limited by the Court,
it is the federal courts and not the Congress which is most di-
rectly affected.
While the legal concepts surrounding issues of federalism
must be given due deference, the overriding reality in this sector
is one which concerns politics and related issues of econom-
ics.70 (It seems unlikely that any serious student of American
government would argue that the states do not have a significant
role in governance and the federal government needs to respect
that role, but the daily workings of government force the practi-
cal reality on us, that the United States cannot function without
a large centralized government.) The debates which have sur-
rounded the development of presidential positions on federalism
are telling, infrequently told saga, of how the issues of inter-
governmental relationships are first and foremost matters dealt
with in the political arena. In 1987, President Ronald Reagan
issued Executive Order 12,612 which articulated the Reagan
position on the relationship of Washington with the states, and
reflected the President's conservative views that the size and
scope of the federal government should be limited.7' President
Clinton took it on himself to articulate a different vision of gov-
ernment, and actually issued three major executive orders deal-
ing with federalism. Clinton's second Executive Order 13,083
was explicitly designed to replace the prior Reagan order, and
expressed a more expansive view of federal power by removing
restrictions on regulations that had federalism implications or
imposed direct costs. 72 Executive Order 13,083 was harshly
criticized by state officials, to the point that it was rescinded
and replaced with Executive Order 13,132 which adopted more
of a conciliatory, collaborative tone to federalism issues.73 The
Bush administration has indicated that it will move further to
collaborate with states, and will develop an executive order on
federalism which stresses regulatory consolidation, streamlining
70 AEI Federalism Project, supra note 58.
71 Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987); see also Jennie Hol-
man Blake, Note & Comment, Presidential Power Grab or Pure State Might? A
Modern Debate Over Executive Interpretations on Federalism, 2000 BYU L. REv.
293 passim (2000) (discussing executive orders and their implications concerning
federalism issues).72 Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,651 (1998).73 Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (1999).
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of regulatory controls, and providing a liberal grants of waiv-
ers.
74
On the legislative side Congress has seen its share of at-
tempts to create laws which ensure that states will not be over-
run by federal regulations. The most noteworthy of the legisla-
tive efforts is the Unfunded Mandate Act of 199575 which gives
state and locally elected officials the chance to seek a roll call
vote in the Congress concerning any proposed unfunded man-
date. In addition, a somewhat obscure law, the Congressional
Review Act of 1995, provides Congress with the ability to re-
view, and rescind federal agency regulations which have an
economic impact of at least $100 million.76 There have been
other proposed bills which are designed to respect the rights of
states such as the Federalism Accountability Act. Congressional
involvement in the federalism issue is pure politics at work, and
it is not surprising that the state governors through the National
Governors Association have taken up the political gauntlet of
federalism on the state side.77 Unlike the Congress which is us-
ing federalism as a way to court favor with local constituencies,
the governors are more conflicted. States may rail against the
evils of Washington regulators, but their need for money often
turns their invocations of federalism into a plea for funds with
no strings attached.
CONCLUSION
This essay is centered around a very simple notion, namely
that American health policy is desperately in need of a workable
vision, and that vision must inevitably originate with, or be
adopted by, government. The current regulatory landscape in its
attempts to control managed care, and safeguard the public from
abuses, presents a dramatic illustration of the breakdown of
government policy in this major domestic sector. In very broad
terms, the positions which government leaders have taken to-
74 See NGA Actions, Federalism, Preemption, and Regulatory Reform (last
modified Mar. 6, 2001) <http:llwww.nga.org/nga/lobbylssues/1,1169,DL 189,
00.html> (discussing current views on federalism).75 See The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, §205,
109 Stat. 66 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1535).
76 Federalism Accountability Act, H.R. 2245, S. 1214, 106th Cong., § 2
(1999) (promoting federalism and imposing accountability for federal preemption of
state and local laws).
77 See id.
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ward managed care are fundamentally schizophrenic, promoting
the concept as a type of cost effective, market based salvation
for health care, but simultaneously, in reaction to politics, gov-
ernment leaders are railing against the very vehicles of care and
coverage they are promoting. At the core of the current health
care regulatory dysfunction is a system of federalism in which
the respective levels of government are acting in a competitive,
duplicative, and ultimately financially irresponsible manner.
Perhaps this current period of imbalance in intergovernmental
relations could be tolerated in the past, but it is a central feature
in a health system which the Institute of Medicine has recently
classified as being in crisis.78
This essay posits six recommendations, none of which are
original to this author. The six recommendations, creating a
minimum benefit package, eliminating regional variations in
reimbursement policies and available services, developing na-
tional medical practice standards, federalizing patient rights,
recognizing the primacy of state regulation in delivery systems,
and recreating a state based health planning process, would
collectively have a profound impact on health care federalism,
but would each individually also alter intergovernmental rela-
tions in this sector. No doubt there are numerous other ap-
proaches which would be equally, or more, helpful in restoring
a rational balance to health care federalism. The fact is that
whatever solutions are posited, they will be meet with strong
legal and political objections, as the interests in maintaining the
status quo run very deep in the area of federalism. The legal
objections to a realtered federalism have been buttressed by re-
cent Supreme Court decisions which appear to have revitalized
this dormant area. Analysis of recent changes in the Court's po-
sition on federalism demonstrates, however, that while state
sovereignty may have gotten a boost, Congressional power has
not been so much reduced, as it has been mandated by courts to
78 See, e.g., COMMrrEE ON THE CHANGING MARKET, MANAGED CARE, AND
THE FuruRE VIABILITY OF SAFETY NET PROVIDERS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BuT ENDANGERED 10, 205-07 (Mar-
ion Ein Lewin & Stuart Altman, eds., 2000) (describing American "safety-net"
healthcare system, including managed care components, as verging on crisis); Na-
tional Governor's Ass'n, Policy Position: HR-37. Private Sector Health Care Reform
Policy (visited May 14, 2001) <http//www.nga.org/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,
C_POLICYPOSITIONAD_555,00.htmIl> (describing NGA's positions on key fed-
eral-state health policy issues emphasizing greater need for federal-state coordination
and cooperation in state-focused regulation).
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be exercised in less overt ways. Intergovernmental relations in
all sectors, not just health, are first and foremost matters of
politics, and it is in this area where the most serious barriers to
the six recommendations made in this essay will be faced. Poli-
tics, however, is even more malleable than law and even here,
sooner or later pressures for change do create movements.
Perhaps it is inappropriate to be flippant when beginning a
proverbial assault on one of the peaks of American health pol-
icy, federalism, but legal and political realities must not prevent
us from scaling into the thin air of reform. Managed care regu-
lation, as it now stands, lacks vision and purpose, and is not ef-
fective in the face of mounting cost, quality and access prob-
lems. As major changes in health care are being recommended
across the board to deal with managed care problems, commen-
surate changes must occur in the ways in which this sector is
regulated, and changes in federalism should lie at the heart of
any reform agenda. A new century demands new solutions to
the problems inherited from the past and while progress should
be guided by a sense of basic legal principles underpinning the
structure of government, such principles should never be
viewed as absolute, but only as tools to be refitted to the needs
of the times.
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